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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kyle A. Richardson appeals from his judgment of conviction for three counts of
delivery of methamphetamine. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to dismiss his prosecution for an alleged violation of his speedy trial
rights; that the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on an alleged
failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ timelines; that the court
abused its discretion by allowing, after offering a limiting instruction, a state’s witness to
lay foundation for subsequent testimony, notwithstanding Richardson’s objection; and
that the court abused its discretion in its order of restitution.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In September 2011, a confidential informant, Robert Bauer, in an effort to gain
consideration on his own possession of methamphetamine charge, informed police that
Richardson was a drug dealer. (Trial Tr.,1 p.118, L.20 – p.119, L.20; p.120, L.19 –
p.121, L.1.) Officer Dammon directed Mr. Bauer to make a series of recorded phone
calls setting up controlled drug buys. (Id., p.120, Ls.14-18; p.122, L.16 – p.124, L.11.)
Mr. Bauer successfully completed three controlled buys of methamphetamine from
Richardson on September 7, 9, and 14, 2011. (Id., p.133, Ls.10-24; p.140, L.22 –
p.141, L.11; p.154, Ls.9-19; p.225, L.7 – p.227, L.16.) Richardson was served with a
summons to appear on January 4, 2012. (R., pp.35-36.)

1

“Trial Tr.” refers to the transcript of Richardson’s criminal trial held on December 7
and 8, 2015. All other transcripts are referenced by the date of the hearing.
1

On February 22, 2012, the state charged Richardson with three counts of
delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp.57-58.) Before trial, Mr. Bauer, the state’s key
witness, died. (See R., p.125.) Because Bauer had testified and was subject to crossexamination at the preliminary hearing, the state sought to admit the preliminary hearing
transcript. (R., pp.79-80.) Richardson filed motions in both this case and a separate
case objecting to the admission of the transcript. (R., pp.119-23.) Due to the timing of
Richardson’s motions, the district court had to vacate the trial setting. (8/16/2012 Tr.,
p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.4.) The court instead held a hearing on the motions and, ultimately,
excluded the preliminary hearing testimony. (R., pp.166-70.) With permission from the
Idaho Supreme Court, the state filed an interlocutory appeal. (R., pp.182-86.)
Ultimately, the state prevailed on appeal. See State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho
524, 328 P.3d 504 (2014). The remittitur issued on July 16, 2014 (R., p.204), and the
district court held a status conference on July 24, 2014 (R., p.206). During that hearing,
the parties informed the district court that Richardson was no longer in the State of
Idaho but was in federal custody somewhere out-of-state. (7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 –
p.24, L.7.) The district court issued a bench warrant. (R., p.205.)
On February 2, 2015, Richardson filed a motion in which he requested a speedy
trial and final disposition. (R., pp.207-08.) Richardson was, however, still in federal
custody, and returning him to the State of Idaho required compliance with the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The state lodged a detainer against Richardson on
June 24, 2015. (See R., p.273.) Thereafter, on July 21, 2015, the state received the
“Notice of Untried Indictment” with Richardson’s demand for speedy trial and all
necessary certificates to comply with the IAD. (R., pp.219-28.)
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Richardson subsequently filed motions to dismiss his case based on an alleged
violation of his speedy trial rights. (R., pp.230-35, 244-47, 266-68.) The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, determining that the IAD applied to Richardson’s case
and that speedy trial could not be invoked under the IAD until there was compliance
with its requirements. (R., p.273.)
Richardson was brought back to Idaho on October 23, 2015 (see R., pp.281,
365) and his trial began on December 7, 2015 (R., pp.313-23). Following Richardson’s
trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on each count of delivery of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.324-25.) The district court entered judgment against Richardson and sentenced
him to concurrent unified sentences of 12 years with five years fixed on each count,
running those sentences concurrently with Richardson’s federal sentence. (R., pp.35557.) The court also entered an order requiring Richardson to reimburse $2,100 to the
Lewiston Police Department for the controlled-buy monies; $300 to the Idaho State
Police for the analysis of the three samples of methamphetamine; and an additional
$338.46 to the Idaho State Police for the travel and personnel expenses of a lab analyst
who was subpoenaed to testify at Richardson’s trial; totaling $2,738.46 in restitution.
(Aug. R., pp.9-11.) Richardson filed a notice of appeal timely from his judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.359-61.)

3

ISSUES
Richardson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it violated Mr. Richardson’s speedy
trial rights?
2.
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Richardson’s motion to
dismiss based on the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers’ 180[-]day deadline?
3.
Did the district court err in admitting evidence of Mr. Richardson’s
prior bad acts?
4.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered
Mr. Richardson to pay restitution in the absence of substantial evidence to
support such an award?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Richardson failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to dismiss this case based on an alleged speedy trial violation?
2.
Has Richardson failed to show that the district court erred when it determined
that the state did not violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers?
3.
Has Richardson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
allowed the detective to lay foundation for his subsequent testimony about his
investigation?
4.
Has Richardson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
ordering restitution?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His
Motion To Dismiss This Case Based On An Alleged Speedy Trial Violation
A.

Introduction
This case began on January 4, 2012, when the state filed its initial criminal

complaint and Richardson was served with a summons to appear.

(R., pp.32-36.)

Between the preliminary hearing and the initial trial date, the state’s confidential
informant died. (See R., p.125.) Because the confidential informant had testified under
oath and been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, the state
requested to introduce his preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

(R., pp.79-80.)

Richardson objected (R., pp.119-23) and the district court excluded the testimony (R.,
pp.166-70). The state filed an interlocutory appeal and ultimately prevailed on June 24,
2014. (R., pp.192-202.) The remittitur issued on July 16, 2014. (R., p.204.)
Following remittitur, the district court held a status conference during which the
parties informed the court that Richardson was in federal custody. (R., p.206; see also
7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7.) Richardson had been arrested and taken into
federal custody on December 1, 2012. (R., p.231.) The district court issued a bench
warrant on July 24, 2014. (R., p.205.) Eventually, Richardson was located and, after
complying with the procedures set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, was
ultimately returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015.

(R., p.281.)2

Richardson was

brought to trial on December 7, 2015. (R., pp.313-23.)
2

Repeatedly, Richardson claims that he “sat in jail” or “in prison” while waiting for his
trial to commence. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Notwithstanding these assertions, the
record appears to show that Richardson did not sit in jail (at least in relation to this case)
5

Prior to trial, Richardson filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his speedy trial
rights had been violated. (R., pp.244-47, 266-68.) The district court denied the motion.
(R., p.273.) On appeal, Richardson asserts that the district court erred when it denied
his motion to dismiss, arguing, as he did below, that both his constitutional and statutory
speedy trial rights were violated. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-21.) Application of the correct
legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no violation of Richardson’s
speedy trial rights. The district court correctly denied Richardson’s motion to dismiss
and should be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s rights to a speedy trial

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d
931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct. App.
2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported
by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial court’s application of
the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at 1198; State v. Davis,
141 Idaho 828, 835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

Richardson’s Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights Were Not Violated
“Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13

of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial.”
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007). When

until he was returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015; Richardson only requested credit
for time served “from October 23, 2015, the date that he arrived in Nez Perce County
from the Federal penitentiary.” (R., p.365.)
6

analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal constitutions, the
Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho
113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to
a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
Contrary to Richardson’s arguments on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-20), balancing
of these factors in this case supports the district court’s determination that Richardson
failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
1.

The Delay Of Almost Four Years Between Richardson’s Arrest And Trial
Necessitates Inquiry Into The Other Barker Factors

The first factor for this Court to consider is the length of the delay leading up to
trial. “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For purposes of the
Sixth Amendment, “the period of delay is measured from the date there is ‘a formal
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer a criminal charge.’” Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953).
“Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date
formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first.” Lopez,
144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted).
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The state filed its initial criminal complaint, the magistrate found probable cause
and bound Richardson over for trial, and Richardson was served with a summons to
appear on January 4, 2012. (R., pp.32-36.) Richardson was finally brought to trial on
December 7, 2015. (R., pp.313-23; see also Trial Tr.) As Richardson notes on appeal
(Appellant’s brief, p.12), that is a delay of almost four years. The state agrees with
Richardson that such a lengthy delay triggers the balancing test of Barker.
Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in
and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199. However, the length of the
delay is not dispositive. None of the four Barker factors is by itself “either a necessary
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Barker,
407 U.S. at 533. Because (as shown below) the lengthy delays in this case were either
directly attributable to Richardson’s actions, or were otherwise for valid reasons, and
because (despite his arguments to the contrary) Richardson was not unfairly prejudiced
by the delay, the length of the delay should be excused.
2.

The Lengthy Delays In This Case Are Attributable To Richardson

Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial
violations is the recognition that “pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly
justifiable.” Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United States,
505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)). For that reason, different weights are assigned to different
reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the Supreme Court:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
8

than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). However, delays “caused by the defense weigh against
the defendant.” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009). As the Supreme Court
noted in Barker, “if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given
effect under standard waiver doctrine.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.
On appeal, Richardson specifically complains of two delays. He first complains
that the state caused his trial to be delayed by asking for a continuance due to a key
witness’ unavailability on the original trial dates. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.) But he
then notes that “[t]he second trial setting was still within the speedy trial limits.” (Id.,
p.15.) Regardless, requesting a brief continuance due to a key witness’ unavailability
falls squarely within the “valid reason” exception of Barker, and is a justified delay.
Moreover, the state’s request for a continuance for an unavailable witness was
not the only such request prior to the first trial setting. Both parties stipulated to a
continuance of the preliminary hearing (R., p.45), and Richardson also requested a twoweek extension during the pretrial briefing phase (R., p.70). Both of these delays of the
court’s schedule are, at least in part, attributable to Richardson.
Richardson next complains that the state’s interlocutory appeal delayed his trial
by two years.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)

The delay necessitated by the state’s

appeal does not count toward the speedy trial calculation under the facts of this case.
On March 23, 2012, between the preliminary hearing and the initial trial setting in this
case, the state’s confidential informant, Robert Bauer, died. (See R., p.125.) Because
Mr. Bauer had testified under oath at the preliminary hearing and had been subjected to
cross-examination, the state sought to admit his testimony as an unavailable witness
9

under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).

(R., pp.79-80; see also pp.85-102.)

Richardson objected to the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony and asked
the district court for an order excluding it on the ground that it would violate his
confrontation rights. (R., pp.119-23.) The district court granted Richardson’s motion on
that ground. (R., pp.166-70.)
But that ground was erroneous. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State
v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527-28, 328 P.3d 504, 507-08 (2014),3 all that is required
to satisfy the defendant’s confrontation rights is an adequate opportunity to crossexamine the witness. The magistrate court did not limit the scope of Richardson’s
cross-examination; the cross-examination included all relevant trial issues; and
Mr. Bauer did not hamper Richardson’s cross-examination by being evasive or
untruthful in his answers. Id. at 529, 328 P.3d at 509. Richardson therefore had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Bauer during the preliminary hearing, and
the district court erred when it concluded otherwise. Id. at 527-30, 328 P.3d at 507-10.
Moreover, contrary to his arguments before the district court, Richardson had sufficient
opportunity to prepare to cross-examine Mr. Bauer because, even before the state
revealed his identity, the evidence in this case showed that Richardson knew that
Mr. Bauer was the confidential informant. Id. at 531-32, 328 P.3d at 511-12. The Idaho
Supreme Court therefore held that the preliminary hearing transcripts could be admitted
at trial. Id. at 532, 328 P.3d at 512.
Richardson acknowledged below that, “since the trials were vacated because of
some lateness of the motions” to exclude the testimony, the delays were at least in part
3

The Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Richardson is included in the clerk’s
record at pages 192-202.
10

attributable to him and there was no “implication of speedy trial at all because of that.”
(8/16/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-8.) Similarly, because Richardson caused the need for the
interlocutory appeal by inviting the district court to exclude essential evidence on an
erroneous basis, the attendant delay was also attributable to Richardson and does not
implicate his speedy trial rights.
Even if the delay for the interlocutory appeal were attributable to the state, it still
would not count toward a speedy trial calculation. As the United States Supreme Court
has previously held, where “[t]here is no showing of bad faith or dilatory purpose on the
Government’s part”; where “the Government’s position [on appeal] was strong”—and
the Court recognized that reversals on appeal “are prima facie evidence of the
reasonableness of the Government’s actions”; and “the District Court chose not to
subject [the defendant] to any actual restraints pending the outcome of the appeal[]”; the
delay caused by an interlocutory appeal should not be accorded any weight in
determining whether the defendant suffered a violation of his speedy trial rights. United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986).
Richardson has failed to show any “bad faith or dilatory purpose on the state’s
part” in this case. Rather, the state’s appeal was necessary: The witness, Mr. Bauer,
was the confidential informant who directly participated in the controlled buys with
Richardson, which were the bases for the charges against him.

And as the state

explained, it could not procure any other evidence of this direct nature. (R., p.155.) The
state prevailed on appeal, see Richardson, supra; so there is prima facie evidence,
unchallenged by Richardson, that the state’s appeal was reasonable.

And finally,

though Richardson was incarcerated before the appellate proceedings concluded, the

11

district court did not place any restraints upon him; rather, Richardson was arrested on
December 1, 2012, and was subsequently convicted and incarcerated on unrelated
federal charges during the pendency of the entire appeal. (R., p.231.) Any delay
caused by the state’s interlocutory appeal is reasonable and should not be given any
weight in determining whether Richardson’s speedy trial rights were violated.
Finally, though not noted by Richardson on appeal, another substantial delay in
this case was caused by Richardson’s incarceration in federal prison on an unrelated
conviction.

As noted above, Richardson was first taken into federal custody on

December 1, 2012. (R., p.231.) After remittitur entered in the interlocutory appeal on
July 16, 2014 (R., p.204), the district court held a hearing on Richardson’s case (R.,
p.206; 7/24/2014 Tr.).

During that hearing, the parties informed that court that

Richardson was in federal custody, and, in accordance with the parties’ request, the
district court issued a bench warrant. (7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7; R., p.205.)
That warrant was not returned until October 23, 2015 (R., p.281), when Richardson was
finally brought back to the State of Idaho. This delay, occasioned by Richardson’s
federal conviction and incarceration, is not attributable to the state.
3.

Richardson Asserted His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights

The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant asserted
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant’s assertion of his right is “entitled
to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of
the right.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171.
“[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial.” Id.
12

The district court found, and it is not disputed, that Richardson asserted his
speedy trial rights. (See R., p.273.) Richardson asserts that the district court erred in
concluding that Richardson’s assertion did not become effective until June 24, 2015,
noting that he “caused to be filed” a speedy trial demand on February 2, 2015.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.) Because Richardson was in federal custody when he
began to assert his speedy trial rights, the district court is correct under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD) that no demand became effective until after the formal
lodging of a detainer. See I.C. § 19-5001. The IAD is addressed in greater detail in
Argument II. However, for purposes of this argument, it is sufficient to recognize that
Richardson did assert his speedy trial rights.
4.

Richardson Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By The
Delays In His Case

The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature and
extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. Barker,
407 U.S. at 532. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired.
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). “The third of
these is the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the
defense ‘skews the fairness of the entire system.’” Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d
at 1290 (citations omitted).
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Though Richardson was incarcerated while awaiting trial, and during that time
may have felt the anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer, he
was in federal custody, not in Idaho’s custody. In fact, notwithstanding Richardson’s
assertions to the contrary (see Appellant’s brief, p.9), it appears that Richardson never
“sat in jail” in relation to this case until he was returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015
(see R., p.365 (only requesting credit for time served from that date)). Contrary to his
arguments on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18), any prejudice Richardson suffered
while in federal custody is due to his being convicted and incarcerated in an unrelated
federal case, not to delays in his Idaho case.
Richardson also argues that he suffered prejudice due to the fading memories of
Officers Dammon and Yount, two witnesses for the state. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-19.)
The state submits that the fading memories of key state’s witnesses—the investigating
officers in this case—does not prejudice the defense, but the prosecution. The United
States Supreme Court recognized as much when it noted:
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the
commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become
unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the
prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is
the prosecution which carries the burden of proof.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 521. Because, if anything, the delay prejudiced the prosecution,
“this factor should be given a very light weight, if any,” for Richardson. Avila, 143 Idaho
at 854, 153 P.3d at 1200 (citation omitted).
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5.

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A
Speedy Trial Violation

The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, must be
balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual’s right to a speedy trial was
violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, though there was a considerable delay
in bringing Richardson to trial, because almost all of that delay is directly attributable to
Richardson’s inviting the district court to make an erroneous ruling on the admissibility
of essential evidence in his case (which necessitated an interlocutory appeal), and his
federal conviction and incarceration on unrelated charges, it does not count toward the
speedy trial calculation. Moreover, though Richardson did assert his speedy trial rights,
he failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced by the delay. Richardson has
therefore failed to show error in the denial of his motion to dismiss.
D.

Richardson Waived His Statutory Speedy Trial Rights
Richardson also argues that his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)

This argument fails because Richardson waived his

statutory speedy trial rights when he caused his trial to be postponed. Under Idaho
Code § 19-3501(2), the district court, “unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed … [i]f a defendant, whose trial has
not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months
from the date that the information is filed with the court.” On February 22, 2012, the
state filed an information charging Richardson with three counts of delivery of
methamphetamine. (R., pp.57-58.) The trial was initially set for June 4, 2012 (R.,
pp.67-68), but was continued to August 20, 2012, to accommodate a witness who would
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have been unavailable on the initial date (R., pp.72-74). The subsequent date would
have been within the statutory timeframe.
However, less than two weeks before trial, Richardson filed motions in both this
case and a related case objecting to the state’s motion to admit the preliminary hearing
transcript at trial. (R., pp.119-23.) At a hearing the following week, the district court
determined that, “because the motions filed on [Richardson’s] behalf [had] come in very
close to the trial date” and needed to be ruled upon, it would have to “vacate the trial
settings for Monday.”

(8/16/2012 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.4.)

Defense counsel

concurred and further assured the court that, because the trial was vacated due to
“some lateness of the motions,” the defense did not “consider that there [was] any
implication of speedy trial at all because of that.” (Id., p.15, Ls.4-8.) Because the
“lateness of [Richardson’s] motions” required the district court to “vacate the trial
setting,” Richardson waived his statutory speedy trial rights. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
327, 332, 256 P.3d 735, 740 (2011).
Even if Richardson had not waived his statutory speedy trial rights when he
caused his trial date to be postponed, there still would be no violation of those rights
because, as shown above, any delays in this case were for good cause. “[G]ood cause
means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the
delay.” Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. The first significant delay in this case
arose from the filing of a necessary interlocutory appeal to correct the district court’s
erroneous exclusion of the confidential informant’s prior testimony. “An interlocutory
appeal by the State from an order excluding evidence ordinarily is a valid reason that
justifies delay.” Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952. This is especially true in this
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case: The state did not appeal because it wanted to delay the case; the state appealed
because the confidential informant was the only witness who directly participated in the
controlled buys with Richardson, and his testimony was essential to the state’s case.
And the state prevailed on appeal, which is prima facie evidence that its arguments and
grounds for appeal were reasonable. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 316.
The second significant delay in bringing Richardson to trial, as outlined above,
was caused by his conviction and incarceration on unrelated federal charges. After
remittitur entered on the state’s interlocutory appeal, the parties informed the district
court that Richardson was being held out-of-state in federal custody. (7/24/2014 Tr.,
p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7.) The state ordinarily cannot proceed against a defendant until
that defendant is within its jurisdiction. After compliance with the IAD, Richardson was
finally returned to the State of Idaho on October 23, 2015. (R., p.281.) And he was
brought to trial on December 7, 2015. (R., pp.313-23.)
Thus, either Richardson waived his statutory speedy trial rights when he caused
his trial date to be postponed by filing the late motions, or any subsequent delays of his
trial were for good cause. Under either theory, Richardson has failed to show that his
statutory speedy trial rights were violated.

The district court’s order dismissing

Richardson’s motion to dismiss should be affirmed.
Finally, even if Richardson had not waived his statutory speedy trial rights, and
the interlocutory appeal and Richardson’s absence from the state did not constitute
good cause sufficient to justify delay of his trial beyond the six-month statutory period of
Idaho Code § 19-3501, any error in the court’s order denying Richardson’s motion to
dismiss would still be harmless.

Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error,
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defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.” Where, as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a
statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice. See I.C. §§ 19-3501,
19-3506. Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of a statutory
speedy trial violation, the state could have simply refiled the charges and proceeded to
trial against Richardson in a new criminal action.
II.
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Determined That
The State Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainers
A.

Introduction
As noted above, Richardson filed below a motion to dismiss his case based on

an alleged violation of his speedy trial rights. (R., pp.244-47, 266-68.) The district court
denied that motion, finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) applied to
Richardson’s case, that a detainer was not lodged until June 24, 2015, and that speedy
trial could not be invoked until that date. (R., p.273.) Richardson asserts that the
district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because, he argues (contrary to
precedent), his substantial compliance with the IAD should have been sufficient to
trigger the IAD’s statute of limitation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-36.) Application of the
correct law to the facts before the district court, however, shows no error in the district
court’s denial of Richardson’s motion to dismiss based on the IAD.
B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute presents questions of law over

which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798,
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102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710
(Ct. App. 2004).
C.

The State Of Idaho Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainers’
Statute Of Limitation
The authority to extradite fugitives and return them to answer criminal charges

filed against them is found in Article IV, § 2, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution,
which reads:
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand
of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up,
to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.
This provision gives states the right to obtain the return of fugitives who flee to other
states. It does not, however, create a mandatory obligation on the part of any state to
seek or secure the return of such fugitives. Rather, the decision to seek extradition lies
wholly within the discretion of the executive authority of the demanding state, and a
fugitive has no right to compel his extradition. Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178
(10th Cir. 1999); Brownfield v. Stovall, 85 F.App’x 123, 126 (10th Cir. 2003).
Unlike the demanding state, which has discretion to choose whether to seek
extradition, asylum states generally do not have such discretion. As the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, “the duty imposed by the Extradition Clause
on the asylum State [is] mandatory” and “afford[s] no discretion to the executive officers
or the courts of the asylum State.” New Mexico, ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151,
154-55 (1998) (citing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987); California v.
Sup. Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty., 482 U.S. 400, 405-06 (1987); Kentucky v.
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Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1860)). There is, however, an exception to this rule under the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which provides that when
a criminal prosecution has been instituted against such person under the
laws of [the asylum] state and is still pending, the governor in his
discretion, either may surrender such person on demand of the executive
authority of another state or hold him until he has been tried and
discharged, or convicted and punished in this state.
I.C. § 19-4519.
Recognizing both that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy
trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation,” and that “proceedings with
reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures,” the federal
government and most states (including Idaho) have adopted the IAD “to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper
status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or
complaints.”

I.C. § 19-5001(a).

Thus, the basic purposes of the IAD are to give

prisoners the right to an expeditious trial after compliance with its terms, and to give
states the right to obtain a prisoner for the purposes of trial. Alabama v. Bozeman,
533 U.S. 146, 151 (2001).
To facilitate the expeditious and orderly disposition of these charges, after
specific requirements have been met, the IAD requires states to bring the fugitive to trial
within 180 days. I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1). After reviewing the record, the district court
determined that the IAD applied to this case and correctly concluded that the state had
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not violated Richardson’s rights under the IAD. (R., p.273.) As the Idaho Court of
Appeals has previously recognized:
For a defendant to invoke the speedy trial provision of the IAD, three
events must occur: (1) the receiving State must place a detainer on a
prisoner in the sending State, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(1); (2) the prisoner must
deliver to the warden or custodial official holding custody over the prisoner
a written notice and request for final disposition, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(2); and
(3) the warden or custodial official must promptly forward the prisoner’s
request and a certificate containing the “term of commitment under which
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole
agency relating to the prisoner” to the appropriate prosecutor and district
court in the receiving State, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(1), (2).
State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, 709, 291 P.3d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 2012) (footnote
omitted).
In this case, the state requested that a detainer be lodged against Richardson on
June 24, 2015. (R., pp.255, 273.) After that detainer was lodged, Richardson then
delivered his written notice and request for final disposition in July. (R., pp.257-64.)
Federal correctional officials forwarded Richardson’s request, together with all
appropriate certificates, to the Idaho prosecutor on July 22, 2015. (R., p.257.) Finally,
Richardson was brought to trial on December 7, 2015 (See Trial Tr.; see also R.,
pp.241, 313-23), which was within the applicable 180-day limit. Richardson’s rights
under the IAD were not violated.
On appeal, Richardson argues that he substantially complied with the IAD by
sending letters to the court and county prosecutor’s office requesting that he be
returned to Idaho for his trial, and therefore the 180-day limit began months earlier than
recognized by the district court.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.22-36.)
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This argument fails.

Idaho requires strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with the IAD. Mangum,
153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52. As detailed above, Richardson did not strictly comply
with the requirements of the IAD until July 22, 2015.
Richardson further asserts that the strict compliance requirement of Mangum is
tempered where “intentional interference by State parties is shown.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.27-30 (citing Mangum, 153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52).) Richardson then appears
to argue that the state’s inability to expedite his extradition after receiving his noncompliant “demands” for trial constitutes “intentional interference.”

(See Appellant’s

brief, pp.28-30.) This argument fails on two grounds: First, as shown at the outset of
this argument, a defendant cannot compel his extradition.

It is entirely within the

discretion of the executive of the demanding state if and when to seek extradition; it is
therefore entirely within its discretion if and when to file a detainer against a fugitive.
Second, this is the exact scenario addressed by the Court of Appeals in Mangum. See
id., 153 Idaho at 707-08, 713, 291 P.3d at 46-47, 52. That Court’s holding, requiring
strict compliance, is no less applicable under the facts of this case.
Finally, Richardson asserts that the bench warrant issued by the district court on
July 24, 2014, is the equivalent of a detainer.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.30-33.)

This

argument fails on multiple grounds. First, as noted above, Idaho precedent requires
strict compliance with the IAD. Mangum, 153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52. The mere
“equivalent” of a detainer is insufficient to strictly comply with the requirements of the
IAD.

Second, under the IAD, the detainer is to be lodged by the appropriate

prosecuting officer of the demanding state. See I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1), (d)(1). A bench
warrant issued by a district judge is not a detainer lodged by a prosecuting officer.
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Third, the United States Supreme Court has defined a detainer as “a request filed by a
criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated asking the
institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release
of the prisoner is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). The bench
warrant, on its face, does none of these things. (See R., p.205.) While a bench warrant
issued by a district court may be a prerequisite for lodging a detainer, the bench warrant
is not a detainer.
Under the IAD, the 180-day limit was triggered when Idaho officials actually
received all of the required certificates and demands from the federal authorities. Idaho
law requires strict compliance with the request provision of the IAD. As demonstrated
by the record, Idaho officials did not receive the required certificates until July 22, 2015.
(R., p.257.) Richardson was brought to trial on December 7, 2015. (R., pp.313-23; see
also Trial Tr.) The trial thus commenced within the 180-day limit established by the IAD.
Richardson has therefore failed to show any violation of his rights under the IAD. The
district court correctly denied Richardson’s motion to dismiss and should be affirmed.
III.
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Allowed The Detective To Lay Foundation For His Subsequent Investigation
A.

Introduction
During the criminal trial, while providing foundation for his subsequent testimony,

the prosecutor asked Detective Dammon how he became involved in the criminal case.
(Trial Tr., p.118, L.20 – p.119, L.3.) The detective answered that he had received
information from a confidential informant. (Id., p.119, Ls.4-5.) Defense counsel made a
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preemptory objection, which was overruled for being premature. (Id., p.119, Ls.6-12.)
The following exchange then ensued:
BY MR. COLEMAN:
Q. So how—how did you become involved on that day?
A. I was provided information from a confidential informant about a
Kyle Richardson being involved in the distribution—
MR. RADAKOVICH: Objection.
THE WITNESS: —of controlled substances.
MR. RADAKOVICH: It’s hearsay.
MR. COLEMAN: May I respond?
MR. RADAKOVICH: More than that, it’s a violation of 404(b).
(Id., p.119, Ls.13-24.) The district court granted the prosecutor leave to respond and
the prosecutor explained,
Your Honor, this isn’t hearsay. It’s being used to show—it’s not being
used to show the truth of the matter asserted; it’s just being used to show
the effect it had on this listener in terms of what he did with his
investigation, the next step.
(Id., p.119, L.25 – p.120, L.6.) The district court agreed and, with a limiting instruction,
allowed the testimony as follows:
Well, I’m going to allow it. It’s foundational. The jury is instructed that this
is information being provided only to show the foundation for what the
officer did. It’s not for the truth of the matter of what’s been said by the
out-of-court statement.
(Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.) The district court never ruled on the Rule 404(b) objection.
On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing the elicited testimony to be presented to the jury over his Rule 404(b) objection.
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(Appellant’s brief, pp.36-48.) Application of the correct legal principles to the facts of
this case, however, shows no abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009)
(citations omitted). “In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will
grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
C.

The Testimony Elicited From Detective Dammon Was Not Hearsay
As noted above, Richardson objected at trial to the elicited testimony on the

basis that it was hearsay. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.13-21.) Hearsay “is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c). But this testimony
was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to show its effect on
the detective, in terms of why he commenced the investigation. (See Trial Tr., p.120,
Ls.1-6.) And the district court took the extra step of instructing the jury to ensure that
the testimony would not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but only as
foundation for the detective’s investigation. (Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.) Because the elicited
testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and the district court
specifically limited the jury’s ability to consider the testimony for the truth of the matter
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asserted, it was not hearsay. The district court properly overruled Richardson’s hearsay
objection and should be affirmed.
D.

Contrary To Richardson’s Arguments On Appeal, Detective Dammon’s Elicited
Testimony Should Not Be Excluded Under Rule 404(B)
On appeal, Richardson does not challenge the district court’s actual ruling;

instead, he claims that the evidence should have been excluded under 404(b).
(Appellant’s brief, pp.36-48.) This argument fails. Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” If the evidence had been
admitted for the purpose of showing that Richardson had previously dealt drugs, such
evidence would be properly analyzed under Rule 404(b). But that is not what happened
in this case. Rather, as shown above, the prosecutor noted that the evidence was
being offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show why Detective
Dammon became involved in the investigation. (Trial Tr., p.119, L.14 – p.120, L.6.)
And the district court gave the jury specific limiting instructions, explaining that the
evidence was only admitted for the purpose of foundation and could not be considered
for the truth of the matter asserted. (Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.) Because this evidence was
specifically not admitted “to prove [Richardson’s] character … in order to show that [he]
acted in conformity therewith,” it is not 404(b) evidence.
Richardson further argues that the district court admitted the testimony as res
gestae. (Appellant’s brief, pp.39-44.) This argument is without merit. As can be seen
through a reading of the transcript, nowhere does that term—or any of its analogues—
appear in relation to the challenged testimony. Richardson also complains that he was
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not given notice that the state would use the supposed 404(b) evidence. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.44-46.) This argument is too without merit. First, as shown above, the elicited
testimony is specifically not 404(b) evidence. Second, while Richardson’s objection was
likely sufficient to preserve his generalized 404(b) argument, he never raised the issue
of notice below, and this specific argument is therefore not preserved. See State v.
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015) (“For an objection
to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must be
clearly stated or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.”).
E.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Permitting The Prosecutor To
Elicit The Challenged Testimony, Such Error Was Necessarily Harmless
Even had the district court abused its discretion by allowing the elicited

testimony, such would not constitute reversible error because it would be harmless.
“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected ….” I.R.E. 103(a). See also I.C.R. 52 (“Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.”).

In determining whether error is harmless, “[t]he inquiry is whether,

beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citations omitted).
This Court may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the elicited testimony
did not affect Richardson’s conviction on at least two grounds. First, as shown above,
the district court properly instructed the jury, eliminating the potential for prejudice to
Richardson by limiting the purpose for which the jury could consider the testimony. This
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Court “presume[s] that a jury follows the instructions it is given.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho
1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013). If the jury followed the instructions in this case, then it
only considered the testimony as foundation for the officer’s investigation and not for the
truth of any matters asserted, and there is no prejudice.
Second, the jury did not convict Richardson because there was evidence that a
convicted drug user, in an effort to mitigate the punishment he was facing for his use,
accused Richardson of also being involved in the distribution of drugs. It convicted
Richardson based on the overwhelming evidence that he, on three separate occasions,
delivered methamphetamine to the confidential informant. (See Trial Tr., p.122, L.13 –
p.166, L.13; p.224, L.12 – p.227, L.16; p.254, L.19 – p.271, L.2; State’s Exs. 4-11.) This
Court, therefore, may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that omission of the
challenged testimony did not contribute to Richardson’s conviction.
The district court correctly overruled Richardson’s trial objection on hearsay
grounds because the elicited testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted and therefore was not hearsay. Richardson’s argument that admission of the
testimony violated Rule 404(b) also fails because the testimony did not present 404(b)
evidence.

Finally, even had the district court abused its discretion by allowing the

challenged testimony, such error would necessarily be harmless because that testimony
did not affect the outcome of Richardson’s trial. The district court’s ruling should be
affirmed.
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IV.
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Ordering Restitution
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Richardson to pay restitution in the amount of

$2,738.46 pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). (Aug. R., p.11.) Of this total, $2,100
would be paid to the Lewiston Police Department to reimburse it for the “buy money” it
expended for the drug transactions, and $638.46 would be paid to the Idaho State
Police for analysis on three separate samples of methamphetamine and for the travel
and personnel expenses of an expert witness at Richardson’s trial, Officer David C.
Sincerbeaux. (Aug. R., pp.9-11.) On appeal, Richardson challenges $300 of the buy
money and the expenses of the expert witness, which totaled $338.46. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.49-54.) Richardson’s challenges fail. The district court’s award of restitution
should be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the

trial court’s discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App.
2013). The trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273,
276 (2013).
C.

The District Court’s Order Of Restitution Was Appropriate
“Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k) once a

defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under Title 37, Chapter 27 of the
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Idaho Code.” State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-58, 281 P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012).
“Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific guidance regarding the nature of a
restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an award, we find guidance in the
general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304.” Id. Under that statute, a restitution award
must be based “upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor,
defendant, victim, or presentence investigator.” State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170,
345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6)). A restitution award “will
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.”

Id. (citations omitted).

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276).
The district court’s restitution award was supported by substantial evidence.
Below, the state submitted evidence both in the form of exhibits, which included receipts
from the Lewiston Police Department and the Idaho State Police, and direct testimony in
response to concerns raised by the defense. Exhibit A showed that the Lewiston Police
Department had expended buy money in the amounts of $200 on September 7, 2011;
$400 on September 9, 2011; $1,200 on September 14, 2011; and an additional $300 on
September 23, 2011. (Aug. R., p.4.) Detective Dammon, who prepared the document,
explained that the first three disbursements were for drug buys. (5/19/2016 Tr., p.16,
Ls.12-17.)

However, during two of those buys, the police team received drugs in

advance, and so still owed money, hence the additional $300. (Id., p.16, Ls.18-24; see
also Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.10-20; p.224, L.19 – p.225, L.12.) All of the amounts requested,
totaling $2,100, were expended during the course of the police investigation.
(5/19/2016 Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.3.)
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Exhibits B-E detailed the expenses of the Idaho State Police. Exhibit B was the
subpoena commanding Officer Sincerbeaux, a forensic expert, to appear at
Richardson’s trial. (Aug. R., p.5.) Officer Sincerbeaux appeared as an expert witness
at trial. (Trial Tr., pp.252-73; see also Aug. R., p.10.) Exhibit C was the receipt for
costs incurred for the expert witness’s travel and hourly expenses. (Aug. R., p.6.) It
showed that the witness had accrued 5.5 hours of work at $37.32 per hour for $205.26,
and per diem, lodging, and transportation costs of $133.20, for a total of $338.46. (Id.)
Exhibits D and E were receipts for costs incurred for the forensic analysis performed by
the Idaho State Lab on the three samples of methamphetamine tested in Richardson’s
criminal cases, each costing $100, for a total of $300. (Aug. R., pp.7-8.) All of these
exhibits detailed that these requests were in relation to Richardson’s criminal cases,
and Exhibits B and C listed the case numbers. (Aug. R., pp.5-8.)
Richardson stipulated to the admission of the state’s exhibits (5/19/2016 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.15-22), and specifically did not dispute the Idaho State Lab’s analysis fees (id.,
p.14, Ls.3-4). However, counsel raised three objections to the restitution: (1) that there
were only three controlled buys but restitution was being sought for four disbursements;
(2) that counsel did not know how the state’s expert witness calculated his hourly rate
and believed that the witness may have mitigated his lodging costs by traveling and
testifying on the same day; and (3), generally, that the state was seeking restitution at
all, as (Richardson argued) it was not a “victim” under the restitution statute. (Id., p.13,
L.13 – p.14, L.11.)
Ultimately, the district court did not find Richardson’s arguments persuasive. As
the district court correctly concluded, the state could recover restitution for costs
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incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating violations of the Controlled
Substances Act. (Aug. R., p.10.) And the district court found that all of the restitution
sought was proper under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). (Aug. R., pp.10-11.) It found,
based on the testimony of Detective Dammon and the exhibits, that the state had
expended a full $2,100 in buy money (including the challenged $300), “which was
necessary to set up the controlled buys which led to [Richardson’s] arrest.” (Id.) It
found that the expert witness testified at trial and the Idaho State Police submitted his
travel and personnel costs in the amount of $338.46. (Id.) There was no evidence that
the costs associated with the state’s expert witness were inappropriate. (Aug. R., p.11.)
Finally, though not challenged, the district court found that the Idaho State Police had
expended $300 on tests confirming that the substance from Richardson’s case was
methamphetamine. (Aug. R., pp.10-11.)
On appeal, Richardson must show clear error in the district court’s factual
findings. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170, 345 P.3d at 229. He cannot do so. Instead,
Richardson raises two objections to the restitution award: First, he claims that under
State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017), the cost receipt for
expenses of the expert witness was insufficient to constitute evidence to support the
restitution award. (Appellant’s brief, pp.52-54.) Second, he claims that, because Officer
Dammon lacked direct knowledge on the final $300 payment of buy money, his
testimony was insufficient to constitute evidence supporting that amount of restitution.
(Appellant’s brief, p.54.) Both arguments ultimately fail.
Regarding the costs of the expert witness, as noted above, under Idaho Code
§ 37-2732(k), the state is entitled to restitution for costs actually incurred. Contrary to
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Richardson’s argument on appeal that there is no evidence that restitution reflects
actual costs, Exhibit C, on its face, is a request “for cost incurred by the Idaho State
Police lab for travel to testify on this case 12/08/15.” (Aug. R., p.6.) And, contrary to
Richardson’s assertion that “there is nothing” explaining “what the costs were for,” the
exhibit actually delineates the costs: $205.26 for the personnel costs (which defense
counsel apparently understood included the expert’s appearance in court and the two to
two and a half hours of travel time between Lewiston and Coeur d’Alene, each way (see
5/19/2016 Tr., p.20, L.4 – p.21, L.3)) and $133.20 for the expert witness’s per diem,
lodging, and transportation expenses (Aug. R., p.6). Because the Idaho State Police,
as averred in the receipt and found by the district court, actually incurred these costs,
they were entitled to the $338.46 of restitution. The district court’s restitution award is
therefore supported by substantial evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Second, Richardson argues that $300 of the $2,100 of restitution requested for
the “buy money” was inappropriate because “the witness who testified only had direct
knowledge of the payment of $1,800 … and was not present for the $300 purportedly
spent on September 23, 2011.” (Appellant’s brief, p.54.) Thus, Richardson argues that
restitution for the $300 of buy money is inappropriate because it was based on hearsay.
That argument is without merit. As noted above, because Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) is
“short on specific guidance regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure
to obtain such an award,” appellate courts “find guidance in the general restitution
statute.”

Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257-258, 281 P.3d at 94-95.

Under the general

restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304:
Each party shall have the right to present such evidence as may be
relevant to the issue of restitution, and the court may consider such
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hearsay as may be contained in the presentence report, victim impact
statement or otherwise provided to the court.
I.C. § 19-5304(6). Because the district court specifically may consider hearsay that is
relevant to the issue of restitution, and there is no argument that the officer’s testimony
was not relevant, the district court properly considered this evidence.

The district

court’s restitution award is therefore supported by substantial evidence and should not
be disturbed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Richardson’s conviction and
sentence, and the district court’s order of restitution.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2017.

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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